Friday 2 November 2012

Supercharge

A barrage, even if it is not one's first, is a difficult thing to write about. It cannot be taken apart and described in detail, ands in the mass it is so overwhelming that no broad picture of it can possibly be convincing. The noise is unbelievable. Of one shell be fired from one twenty-five-pounder gun at night, the infantryman first sees a flash far behind him and a few seconds later hears the sound of the gun. Again there is a slight pause; and far overhead a shrill sound, somewhere between a whistle and a sigh and a small wind blowing across the strings of a harp, grows in volume and deepens in tone until the shell roars into the ground ahead of him. There is a red flash, and an explosion which has a distinct metallic clang in it. If the shell falls at some distance, the clang has an almost bell-like quality. Most of the fragments travel forward, and raise long scuffs of dust which are distinct from the dust of the explosion itself. The noise of the explosion is very great.

Tuesday 23 October 2012

The night before Alamein

Obviously, the initial attack would have to take place at night: we should be slaughtered to no purpose of we tried to advance in daylight. Equally obviously, many thousands of men trying to form up without landmarks and in darkness on our start line (which was a thousand yards out in No Man's Land) would become hopelessly lost before the battle began unless steps were taken to prevent it. Our battalion's first task was to lay white tape along the whole of the Highland Division start-line, a distance of two thousand five hundred yards, and from there tape back nine separate routes by which the other battalions could advance on to the line. After that their fate would be in their own hands, but at least they would start in order.

Tuesday 16 October 2012

Somewhere in France

Mike and I played a Franco-Prussian war game using Neil Thomas's 19th Century rules. For full retro effect, the rules were in a hardback book, and the figures were 25mm. I had never played these before and I don’t think Mike had either, but he had prepared a cheatsheet so we got by reasonably well.
The scenario was what Neil calls a ‘pitched battle’, which was actually a meeting engagement with both sides advancing from their base edges onto the battlefield, the objectives being in no-man’s land at deployment. As the defender, a random dice roll resulted in three of my units being delayed in reaching the battlefield, whilst another random dice roll resulted in two of Mike’s going missing completely. As a result, he had a slight numbers advantage in the first 6 bounds, and I would have a larger advantage after that if I hadn’t lost too many units first. We each had a single cavalry unit, half a dozen infantry units and one or two guns and skirmishers. I did not have a good sense of the scale of the game, but if infantry units represented battalions, cavalry units would be regiments and skirmishers companies.

Wednesday 10 October 2012

A Zulu Battle

On 21st January 1879, colonial horse and Natal Native infantry of No. 3 Column conducted a reconaissance of the Mangeni Gorge. In the late afternoon, a strong force of Zulus was discovered in the broken ground at the head of the gorge, near the Mdutshana hill. Major Dartnell,. commanding the volunteers, decided to remain close to the enemy overnight, calling on Lord Chelmsford's main force for help.

When the news reached him shortly after midnight, Lord Chelmsford ordered out the second battalion, 24th Regiment, 4 guns and the imperial mounted infantry (men recruited from the regular infantry regiments in Natal) to reinforce Dartnell and attack the Zulus. On the 22nd, Chelmsford thus found half his No. 3 Column, with himself at the head, skirmishing against a handful of scattered Zulu irregulars whilst the main Impi attacked at Isandlwana. The 'strong' force at the Mangeni thus turned out to be nothing of the kind, but Dave and I 'refought' the battle that Chelmsford expected to fight on the 22nd against a body of several thousand Zulus. I knew the rules better so gave him the choice of sides and, after consulting the dice, he opted to be Zulu.

Tuesday 2 October 2012

La Forbie Refought



The Guildford Wargamers played Ironbow again on Monday night. In a scenario ‘inspired’ by the battle of La Forbie in 1244, an Ayyubid Egyptian army led by Baibars (Andrew D), consisting mostly of Kwarismian mercenaries, took on an alliance between the Ayyubids of Syria (Dave) and the Kingdom of Jerusalem (Daniel). I (Andrew F) umpired and generally criticised. Although the Christians provided the majority of the troops on the allied side, it was Dave, as al-Mansur of Homs, who was C-in-C.

The allies deployed with the village of La Forbie and some scattered olive groves on their right. Into these constricted areas they packed all their Frankish foot – 8 elements each of sergeants and crossbows. Two commands of knights, one secular one Order, (with a few Turcopoles) filled the centre, then a command of less-than-useful Syrian foot, al-Mansur with a single unit of 4 Ghulams under his own command. On the far right wing a command of irregular Turcomen was under an Nasir Dawud of Kerak.

Saturday 29 September 2012

Coral Sea Campaign Part 2

This is my second report of proceedings. The first report is here. In between the two, I have been sailing in company with the Port Moresby invasion fleet while a major carrier battle was fought.



Scouting Force Report. Under way in the Coral Sea, 6 May

In accordance with your orders, I took under command the cruisers CL Tenryu, CL Yubari and CL Tutsata; and the destroyers DD Yuzuki, DD Kikuzuki, DD Yayoi and DD Oite.

I proceeded for 2hrs in a NNE direction at 15Kts in order to investigate the suspected enemy activity in that direction. This low speed was designed to minimise our visibility to any enemy, so that we could secure surprise for a torpedo attack. Maximum visibility distance was about 5 nautical miles, and ships were disposed that distance apart. The left of the line passed within sight of the small island in V2 shortly after 01:00hrs and the line was extended from V22 to W23, the right hand destroyer having partial observation into W24, no contacts were reported.

At 03:00 the right hand destroyer reported sporting the western tip of Woodlark coming into view. The line was extended across U23, U24 and part of V25.

I appreciated that, if there ever was an enemy force present, its course was either North or East (in either of which case there was no real threat to the main force), or it may have been proceeding South, in which case it might be between me and the main force. This I considered unlikely, but if the enemy were on an easterly course, there was then no prospect of finding them as they would be in or about W26 and heading away from us.

As I had fulfilled your orders, and judged that there was no likelihood of contact by continuing on my current course, I therefore turned the scouting force to the SSW, closed up to normal stationkeeping distance, and worked up to 30 knots with the intention of returning to the main fleet.

Shortly after 05:00hrs, the force was in line abreast heading SSW at 30 knots. DD Yuzuki was out of position a little ahead of the starboard wing when she detected three enemy destroyers in arrowhead formation about 1 nm apart at a range of about 5 nm. The enemy were heading due North at high speed. The enemy were to my SSW.

The enemy’s formation indicated that they were screening a heavy force to their rear against submarine attack. The range was well within effective reach for Type 93 torpedoes, however our position was too fine on the enemy’s bow for effective torpedo engagement.

I therefore wished to gain a position broader on the enemy’s bow whilst maximising my presumed advantage from having sighted first. My force was not suitable for a prolonged gunnery engagement. I therefore detached DD Yuzuki to the W to distract and confuse the attention of the enemy, changed course with the rest of the force together to the SE and began to make smoke in order to obscure the silhouettes of our ships and to provide for a rapid escape under smoke when our attack had been completed.

These manoeuvres were completely successful. DD Yuzuki engaged the enemy’s destroyer screen with guns and torpedoes. Shortly afterwards the main force engaged. An enemy cruiser of the Portland class was sighted at the head of the enemy line and at once engaged with torpedoes. Two hits were observed, and the first 20 metres of the enemy’s bow was seen to have been blown off. Enemy return fire against the main force was ineffective.

The enemy now turned sharply away under smoke, on to a course to the NW. This placed us in a poor position to engage further with torpedoes. Moreover we were brought under fire by highly accurate 6” gunnery directed from beyond visual range by unknown technical means. I therefore concluded that it was time to disengage.

Unfortunately at this time an enemy shell came inboard DD Yuzuki and decapitated her captain, who had hitherto been fighting his ship with great success against superior numbers of the enemy’s destroyer screen. The loss of the captain, and other members of the bridge crew, disrupted the command of the ship and Yuzuki also came under fire from 6” guns directed from beyond visual range. The enemy secured a number of hits in this way which resulted in the loss of all steam power. As the enemy’s change of course had placed DD Yuzuki squarely in the path of the entire enemy force, her loss was now inevitable and the order to abandon ship was given.

I consider that this order was entirely appropriate. The order to abandon ship ensured that many of the crew were saved, and the lives of these trained and experienced sailors were of greater value than any limited damage that Yuzuki could have done to the enemy with her weak gun armament, her torpedoes having previously been fired.

Having broken contact, I returned to the scene in order to rescue survivors from Yuzuki, and any Americans who might be in the water. A limited search around the area of the last position of the Portland revealed some patches of burning oil, a few bodies and much rubbish and floating debris in the water. No survivors seemed to be present. I have therefore not been able to confirm that Portland was sunk, although I consider it likely.

The enemy were equal in numbers to my force, superior in strength (particularly in relation to gunnery armament, having 6” and 8” guns to our 5.5”) and possessed of unknown technical means to direct their gunnery beyond visual range. I consider it a credit to the training and professionalism of the force under my command that we were able to engage successfully under such conditions. Had a lucky enemy hit not killed the captain of DD Yuzuki at an inopportune moment, I believe this ship might also have escaped unscathed, but in any event her loss is well worth the certain crippling and probable sinking of an enemy heavy cruiser.

Since daylight, the enemy have re-established visual contact with me, but have not sought to engage. I judge there is limited benefit in leading them away from the main fleet, as their air searches are likely to discover the main fleet very rapidly wherever I lead them. My force is not suitably armed to engage enemy heavy cruisers by daylight.

Friday 28 September 2012

Coral Sea Campaign: Part 1




This is the first Report of Proceedings I submitted to my superior officers in the Guildford Wargamers recent Coral Sea campaign


Scouting Force Report Under way in the Coral Sea 5 May 1942

Air Searches Conducted

D1: Dawn position was R37. Six LR Search aircraft successfully launched at 0600 (dawn)

Search zones were completed as follows:


07:00:00
09:00:00
11:00:00
13:00:00
15:00:00
Plane 1
X30
BB27
EE24
II21
LL16
Plane 2
Y35
BB32

FF29
II26
Plane 3
Y40
CC37
FF34
JJ31
MM28
Plane 4
V43
CC42
CC42
JJ36
JJ36
Plane 5
R46
Z45
GG39
GG39
MM33
Plane 6
W47
W47
Z45
Z45
Z45

Landing position was X30, all aircraft were successfully recovered.

Air Search Data

Plane 2 experienced adverse weather conditions which delayed the establishment of its search zone at FF29, and prevented it from pushing its search out to the full depth planned. Otherwise the searches were executed as planned, and I consider the crews executed their mission well.

The requirement for surface assets of this command to rebroadcast sighting reports from our aircraft created unnecessary risk to surface assets, and delay to the prompt receipt of reports by you. Arrangements should be put in place for our LR search frequencies to be monitored directly in your flagship.

Plane 6 at Z45 encountered enemy LR search planes flying NW through its search zone at 1200 hrs and NE to SW shortly after 1600 Hours. Plane 4 reports shooting down a LR search plane transiting S through its search zone JJ36 at about the same time. I conclude that enemy seaplane carriers may have established a dusk landing-on position to the S or SE of our final search positions at JJ36/MM33.

Plane 3 made contact with enemy SR search planes SW of JJ31 and Plane 2 made contact with enemy SR search S of FF29 shortly before 1400. Plane 2 then established a search zone at II26 and made contact in hex GG26 with two large cruisers and 5 destroyers heading NW speed 15knts. I consider that the previously reported SR search contacts are consistent with the presence of this surface task force on a course NW or NNW. There is no indication from these search data of any other surface force (such as the enemy carriers) being also present.

Radio DF data

We detected brief radio transmissions at 1700 hours on a line from Hex X60 to Hex NN12 and at 1000 on a line from HEX T33 to NN39. Neither of these contacts appears to be consistent with the course and speed of the enemy surface task force sighted.

Air Searches Planned

Six LR Search aircraft launched at 0600 (dawn) today search zones are assigned as follows:


07:00:00
09:00:00
11:00:00
13:00:00
15:00:00
Plane 1
BB32
EE34
HH36
KK38
LL41
Plane 2
Y35
BB37
EE39
HH41
HH44
Plane 3
U38
X40
AA42
DD44
EE48
Plane 4
R41
U43
X45
AA47
AA50
Plane 5
M42
Q46
T48
W50
W50
Plane 6
Z27
FF29
II31
LL33
LL33

These constitute the previously ordered search zones, with an additional aircraft (Plane 6) deployed on the southern end of the planned search area.

Landing position has been ordered as X30. We expect to remain in company with your flag during the day and meet this rendezvous, subject to your further orders.


Wednesday 19 September 2012

Three DBA Games



I played three games of DBA last night.

David Hewkin and I have a long history of playing DBA together, but neither of us have played much for a while. For old times’ sake he brought two of his hardy perennial armies: Late Roman and 100YW English. I brought some recently painted biblical sort-of-Syrians and a bunch of identikit High Medievals.

Our first game was therefore Syro-Caananite against Late Imperial Roman. The Canaanites invaded and found (not at all to their surprise) a steep hill in the middle of the board, two good-sized woods in opposite corners, and a compulsory road exiled to the very edge of the board. They attacked with one wood in their right rear and the other in their left front. The Romans put a single psiloi in the wood on their right, their infantry (mostly Auxilia and another Psiloi) in the centre and their mounted (mixed Knights, LH and Cav) on their right.